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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
THE RELIANCE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a corporation
Plaintiff,

Case No.

10087

vs.

GLENNARD M. HOLLINS,
Defendant.

APPELLAN'T'S BRIEF

STATE;MENT OF KIND OF CA:SE
This is an action by a surety to recover from
an indemnitor under an indemnity agreement for
expenses and legal fees incurred 'by the surety by
reason of its ·having executed a Motor Vehicle Dealers Bond as surety.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The defendant was granted summary judgment
upon the grounds that a judgment rendered in a
previous action in which General Credit Company
~ued the plaintiff herein upon the Motor Vehicle
Dealer's Bond mentioned iabove for loss resulting
from the dfeault of Glenn Hollins, Inc., principal
upon said bond, was res judicata of plaintiff's right
1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to recover from the defen·dant herein who is an
individual indemnitor.
RELI'EF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the lower court's
judgment in favor of the defendant 1and prays for
judgment in its favor as a matter of law as to its
right to recover from the defen~dant as an indemnitor on the bond in question and that the action
be reman·ded to the lower court for trial to !allow
plaintiff to prove its damages, or that failing, for
a new trial 011 all issues.
STATE'MENT OF FACTS
On June 20, 19'54, the defendant, Glennard M.
Hollins made application to the plaintiff for a motor
vehicle dealer's bond to be issued in the name of
Glenn H ollins, Inc., principal, and upon which the
plaintiff would appear as surety. The application
contained an indemnity ~agreement which was signed by the defen·dant in his individual capacity,
whereby he agreed to reimburse and imdenmify the
plaintiff for any loss, damage, or expense which
it 1night incur or sustain as a result of having executed said bond (R. 24-25). In consequence of said
applieation, plaintiff issued its bond as surety thereon effective July 6, 1954 (R. 21).
1

Glenn Hollins, Inc., subsequently floor planned
certain autom'Obiles with General :Credit Company,
a financial institution. Under such an arrangement,
the financial institution would hold title to said

...

..

2
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automobiles but deliver possession thereof to the
dealer for the purpose of selling the same. When a
~ale was completed, the dealer would payoff the
existing obligation with the financial institution for
the automobile sold and the finan·cial institution
would deliver the title thereof to the dealer for deli,·rt·y to the purchaser (R. 14-15).
On October 25, 1954, Glenn Hollins, Inc. sold a
1952 Buick to one Irene Pittingall; and on December 12, 1954, it sold a 1953 Oldsmobile to one J. C.
Miller (R. 17). For reasons unknown to appellant,
Glenn Hollins, Inc. was unable to deliver title certificates for sai d automobile to the purchasers
thereof since General Credit Company refused to
surrender the same. However, General Credit Company eventually on or about April 1'5, 19'55, delivered the title certificates directly to the purchasers
of the automobiles in question (R. 18).
On November 15, 1HS5, General Credit Company filed an action against the plaintiff and appellant herein in the T'hird Judicial District Court
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No.
106828, alleging conversion of the aforementioned
automobiles by Glenn Hollins, Inc., to its damage in
the sum of $3,282.00 and th1at the ·defendant, plaintiff and appellant herein, was liable to it as surety
on the motor vehicle dealer's bond pursuant to the
provisions of Section 41-3-18, Utah Code Annotated,
1953 (R. 1-3).
The Trial Court in that action granted judg1
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ment in favor of the defendant, plaintiff and appellant herein, no cause of action, after finding the
following facts:
(a) That Glenn Hollins, Inc. was in possession of the 1952 Buick automobile and the
195'3 Oldsmobile automobile with the knowledge ~nd consent of General Credit Company
.and disposed of the same through resale in the
regular course of business with the knowledge
and consent of General Credit Company (R.
17 para. 5 & 6) .

(b) That Glenn Hollins, Inc. did not willfully, wrongfully, or without the knowledge
and ·consent of General Credit Company dispose of the automobiles in question (R. 17
para. 7).
(c) That Glenn Hollins, Inc. did fail, neglect ~and refuse to pay General Credit Company the amount owing on the aforementioned
automobiles at the time of their resale (R.
1'7 para. 8) .
Subsequently, the present action was commenced by the p'laintlff and appellant herein, to recover
from the indemnitor Glennard M. Hollins for costs
1and expenses which it h·ad suffered by reason of
having execute'd the motor ve'hicle dealer's bond as
surety ( R. 19-·2;5). The matter came on regularly
for hearing on January ·20, 1964, but before the
trial commenced, defendant made a motion to dismiss on the groun,ds that the findings and judgment
in the prior case of General Credit Company vs.
Reliance Insur~ance Company of Philadelphia, Third
4
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.Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State
of lJtah, (~ivil No. 106828, were res judicata to the
i~suP~ raised in the present action and that as a
rnatter of law the plaintiff could not recover. The
trial court granted this motion and entered judgment in favor of the defendant. ( R. 35).
Appellant made a timey motion that the trial
court amend its findings, con·clusions of law, and
judgment, an·d for a new trial to allow the ~appellant
to prove its damages ( R. 36-40), but the motion
\ras denied ( R. 41).
ARGUMEN'T
POINT I.
THE FINDIN·GS O·F THE CO'URT ARE NOT
DETER~l'IN.ATIVE OF THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE
PLEADINGS AND DO NO·T S'UPPORT THE JUD·G:\IENT RENDERED.

Plaintiff's cause of action is based on a contract between the parties. The ·basic rallegations of
the com paint ( R. 19-25) are that plaintiff executed
and issued as surety a Motor Vehicle Dealer's Bon·d
(Para. 3), that the defendant, Glenn1ard M. Hollins,
executed the application for said bond (Para. 4)
\vhich contained and indenmity agreement as set
forth in Exhibit "B" to the com·plaint, an·d that the
plaintiff was subject to a law suit ·an'd sustained
damage by reason of its having executed said bond
(Para. 7).
It is admitted that the complaint in paragraph
5, 6, and 7 incorrectly designates the defendant as
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the person which made the sales of the two cars
in question, received the monies therefor, and was
unable to deliver the titles thereto, rather than the
corporation Glenn Hollins, Inc., defendant's alter
ego. However, pl1aintiff attempted to correct this
drafting error by its proposed fin'dings of fact which
correctly designate Glen Hollins, Inc. as the party
responsible for these acts. The trial court should
have granted plaintiff's motion to include the findings set forth by it since they were all facts that
were either not denied in the pleadings or were
found by the court in the General Credit Company
vs. Reliance Insurance Company of PhiladelphifL

case.
'The fiact that plaintiff's complaint incorrectly
stated the defendant as the tort-feasor rather than
the corporation, Glenn Hollins, Inc., should not be
considered fatal to plaintiff's cause of action because
the action alleged by the pl1aintiff in its complaint
is one based on contract, i.e., the indemnity agreement contained in the application for the used motor
vehicle dealer's bond; it is not a tort action. The
reference to the defaults as alleged in pa~agraphs
5 and 6 of plaintiff's complaint merely state why
pl~aintiff was sued upo11 its bond as surety. These
allegations are actu ally items which could have been
left for evidence at trial since plaintiff's complaint
would have been sufficient if it allege!d only (a)
that the plaintiff executed the bon·d in question as
surety, (b) that defendant agreed to indemnify the
1

1

6
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plaintiff for any expense, loss, or damage which
it experienced by reason of having executed said
bond, and (c) that plaintiff ·h·ad sustained a loss
because of h·aving executed said bond.
The findings, conclusions of law, an'd judgment
of the trial court as they now stan·d are not respon~ive nor determinative of plaintiff's claims for reirnbursetnent under the in·demnity ·agreement. The
findings merely set forth that the trial ·court found
in the prior action of General Credit Company vs.
Reliance Insura·nce Company of Philadelphia, supra,
that the defendant in this action, Glennard M. Hollins, did not commit the acts which cause·d the plaintiff ·and appellant herein to be sued as surety on
the motor vehicle dealer's bon·d and that Glenn Hollins, Inc. ·did not violate provisions of Section
41-1-65, U;C.A., 19·53 with respect to General Credit
Company. They include no findings as to whether
or not the defendant, G'lennard M. Hollins, agreed to
indemnify the plaintiff for expenses incurred by
reason of its having executed said bond or whether
the plaintiff incurred expenses or loss as a result
of having executed the bond. The principal issue in
this case is not whether the defendant, Glennard M.
Hollins, caused the damages which plaintiff claims
to have suffered, but whether he agreed to reimburse the pl~aintiff for any loss it might suffer by
reason of having executed the 'bond in question. This
issue was not determined ·by the trial court in the
instant case since the only evidence introduced at
7
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the hearing of defendant's motion to dismiss was the
file in the piror case of Gener~al Cr.edit Company vs.
Reliance Insurance Comp1any of Philadelphia, supra,
and at no place in the pleading, fin·dings, or judgment ren·dered in that action was the issue of indemnity raised or determined. And, in fact, it could
not have been since defen·dant herein was not a
party to that action and no rights against him could
·have \been determine·d. This point was recently affirme\d by this court in a con·demnation proceeding
State vs. Parker, 13 U. 2·d 65, 368 ;P.2d 585, ( 1962).
Further, it appears to be a well settled rule
that a judgment which goes beyond the pleadings
is invalid. In Rosenthyne vs. Matthews - McCoullouch Co., 51 U. 38, 168 P1ac. 957 ( 1917) the trial
court ordered the plaintiff to repay to the defendant
a certain sum of money for which relief was not
prayed in the answer, and this Court quoting 23
Cyc. 816 at page 43 stated:

"A judgment must accord with an·d be warranted by the pleadings of the party in whose
favor it is rendered; if it is not supported by
the pleadings, it is fatally defective.:
Likewise, this Court stated in Stockyards Natiorval
Bank of South Omaha vs. Br~agg et al, 76 U. 60,
245 Pac. 966 ( 1925) at page 81:
''It is fundamental that a petition or plead~ng
of some kind is the juridical means of vesting
the ·Court with jurisdiction of subjec.t m~tter
to adju·dicate it, and a judgment which IS be8
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yond or not supported by the pleadings must
fall.'' (Emphasis added)
In both of the foregoing cases, the trial court had
granted affirmative relief outside the pleadings and
this Court held that such judgment was invalid. It
i~ appellant's position that judgment denying relief
based on findings which do not determine the essential allegations of the compaint is, likewise, a judgrnent rendered outside the pleadings, and therefore,
invalid.
As previously stated, the only evidence introduced at the hearings 'before the trial court was the
file in General Credit Company vs. Rel~ance Insnrance Company of Philadelphia, supra, and the
judgment rendered in the instant case reflects this
fact ( R. 35) in that it states in part:
'~The

entire file and evi'dence in Civil No.
106828 was received into the evidence, E. L.
Schoenh~als having moved the Court for a
dismissal with prejudice in behalf of ·defendant and stated the basis for said motion into
the record and invited the Court's attention
to the pleadings, facts and evidence and advised the Court on the law . . . ."
Defendant ~and respondent has previously raise·d
the defense that the plaintiff and appellant herein
should have sued the principal on the bond in question, Glenn Hollins Inc., and recovered an unsatisfied judgment before pursuing the defendant.
''nether such a procedure is generally legally neces5al'Y or not is moot because as the records of the
9
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Secretary of State for the State of Utah show, the
charter of said corporation was revoked on September 21, 1H56 for nonpayment of taxes, over two
and one half years before this action was commenced.
CONC'LUSION

Appellant contends that its right to recover
from the defendant on the indemnity agreement incorporated as part of plaintiff's complaint has
never been determined in this or any other lawsuit
and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant and respon·dent herein.
WHEREFORE, appellant prays that the judgment of the trial court be reversed and prays for
judgment in its favor as a matter of law to its right
to recover from the defendant on the indemnity
agreement in question and that the ~action be remanded to the trial court to allow plaintiff to prove
its damages, or that failing, for a new trial on all
.
Issues.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & BALDWIN

H. Wayne Wadsworth
909 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
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